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I present a new framework that reduces idealizations of reasoning by focusing on information states as the basis of beliefs. I use an extended version of the HYPE model [1] with a preference ordering and a binary belief relation. The model explicitly represents possibly inconsistent and incomplete, non-decreasing collections of information. The static belief operator is a hyperintensional, non-monotonic and paraconsistent modality. The resulting belief sets are consistent but not necessarily closed under logical consequence. On the dynamic aspect, I present two dynamic operators, for belief revision and belief contraction, and their duals. During the process of belief formation and belief change, the agents evaluate the collections of information, rather than the pieces of information or the sets of beliefs. In this way, although there is no apparent distinction between basic or direct information and mere inferences that depend on them, it turns out they behave differently over the course of belief change. As a result, the models are more flexible than HYPE models, and the corresponding propositional logic is weaker than the HYPE logic and the dynamic modal logic is weaker than mainstream logical approaches of belief dynamics.

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