In this paper, we argue that the analyses that tackle the question of whether ST—the non-transitive logic of [2]—is classical logic, offer a framework which is overly restrictive of the notion of metainference. We offer a more elegant and tractable semantics for the strict-tolerant hierarchy based on the three-valued function for the conditional and show how this semantics easily handles the introduction of mixed inferences, i.e., inferences involving objects belonging to more than one (meta)inferential level.

We then consider the case of the deep ST theorist; someone committed to the idea that every level of reasoning follows the bounds-consequence reading offered in [1]. Just as the intuitionist demands constructive metareasoning as well as constructive object language reasoning, the deep ST theorist expects their account of inference to apply to metareasoning. Formally, we extend the translation function that maps ST-valid inferences to LP tautologies so we can account for mixed inferences. While this might seem to reinforce the idea that the deep ST theorist simply endorses LP, we argue instead that it attributes to the deep ST theorist a constancy denied to her by the current analyses of ST metareasoning. Additionally, this account provides a model for Carroll’s dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise, with the classical theorist being unable to find a point of difference between themselves and the deep ST theorist, no matter how high in the metatheoretical hierarchy they ascend.
