Assume that for any monadic predication \( P(u) \), which predicates the property being \( P \) of an object \( u \), there is a unique state-of-affairs (which consists in \( u \) being \( P \)) which that predication represents; let \( -P(u)- \) be that state-of-affairs. I will give an argument that for every object \( u \) there are distinct properties being \( P \) and being \( Q \) such that \( *P(u)* = *Q(u)* \). Consider the following impredicative second-order comprehension principle: (G) some \( X \) every \( y \) \( (X(y) \iff \text{some } Z \ (y = *Z(u)* \text{ and not } Z(y))) \).

So far, no problem. But one might think that states-of-affairs have constituents, and that the following principle of constituency is true for any \( u \) and any property being \( P \): (C) The constituents of \( *P(u)* \) are exactly \( u \) and being \( P \).

By (C), the only constituents of \( *P(u)* \) are \( u \) and being \( P \), and the only constituents of \( *Q(u)* \) are \( u \) and being \( Q \), which entails that being \( P = \text{being } Q \).

We could reject (C), at least in its full generality. Or we could say that (G) is defective. The former leads to a novel version of logical-atomist metaphysics. The latter points to a (to my knowledge) novel form of ramification.